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Abstract
The contract is widely conceived as an effective
approach to decrease risk perception and resolve
disputes. However, previous literature on the link
between contracts and risk perception is contradictory,
wherein both positive and negative findings exist. This
study provides a novel insight about the mechanism of
contractual dimensions and considers the boundary
conditions of information technology (IT) integration.
Data collected from 225 retailers of a manufacturer
support most hypotheses. Specifically, contractual
complexity has a positive influence on relational risk,
and contractual recurrence has a negative influence on
both performance and relational risk. This study
further reveals the positive moderating effect of IT
integration on the influence of contractual complexity
on relational risk and the negative effect of IT
integration on the influence of contractual recurrence
on relational risk and performance risk. Implications
and limitations of the study are discussed.

1. Introduction
The last decades witnessed the expansion of
collaborative
network
where
focal
firms
simultaneously interact with plenty of partners for
external resources [1-3]. However, the fear of
uncertainty about the economic and collaboration is
inherent in these relationships [3]. Such concern of risk
makes both parties discreet on engaging in
relationships and ultimately impedes the creation of
joint value [4, 5]. Conceivably, it is pivotal for focal
firms to decrease their counterparts’perceived risk
regarding maintaining a relationship and achieving
performance [5-8]. However, as scholars pointed out,
“practices to manage inter-firm risks and enhance
collaborative action have received much less research
attention” [9, p. 2]. Accordingly, investigating how to
reduce partners’ risk perception not only solves the
collaborative problem faced by focal firms but also
bridges research gaps in risk management.
The contract is widely conceived as an effective
approach to decrease risk perception and resolve
disputes [10, 11]. Some contracts contain a large
number of provisions which obviates moral hazards
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/59476
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

and attenuates the leeway for opportunism [8, 12, 13].
Others seek to codify as little as possible and focus
heavily on ensuring that the parties have a shared
understanding of the relationship so that they can
coordinate partners optimally [14]. These mixed
understanding impede the advancement of this line of
research and manifest the necessity to identify how to
reduce risk perception by contract design.
We find researchers suggest that parties are more
stable when stress coordination mechanism than when
contracts focus on safeguard mechanism [15-17].
Hence, we raise the coordination function of contract
in the context of risk perception [14, 18]. This study is
an effort to address such theoretical gap by
investigating how to reduce risk perception by
designing contract for coordination.
Poppo and Zhou [19] refine contractual dimensions
which include both safeguard and coordination
mechanism. One dimension is contract complexity
which considers many future contingencies that would
change the value of performance—increases in the
costs of their inputs, the decline in demand for the
products, and so on [20]. The other dimension is
contract recurrence which refers to whether parties rely
on the expectation of continued exchanges to
collaborate with their partners [19].
Inter-firm information technology (IT) artifacts
play an increasingly crucial role in contract governance
[21]. As Chi, Zhao [22] claimed, many firms use
highly integrated IT artifacts to facilitate electronic
data interchange. For example, Amazon.com provides
an information system for hundreds of retailers to
create value for its partners by providing information
integration for searching, ordering, and communication
to reduce conflict beyond contracts [23]. These highly
integrated information systems provide a key platform
to coordinate parties that enables them to acquire
information and use it to interact effectively [24-26].
According to transaction cost economy (TCE)
perspective, effective information flow supported by
integrated IT artifacts aligns well to contracts for
coping with hazards [27]. Specifically, IT integration
brings behavioral transparency which improves
awareness of both parties on how contracts are
implemented.
Moreover, frequent and instant communications are
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facilitated by integrated IT artifacts, which is
conducive to reaching a consensus of understanding
contract clauses to guide their collaboration. The
effectiveness of contract framing on reducing
perceived risk is enhanced as a consequence. Although
incorporating IT integration in the relationship between
contract framing and risk perception is important; its
moderating role has not been investigated so far.
Therefore, our research is a trial to address this
research gap by exploring how IT integration
moderates the relationship between contract framing

and risk perception.
These gaps form the basis of our conceptual model,
which examines how contracts, risk perceptions, and
IT integration are intertwined. We ask (1) How does
the coordination mechanism of contract (i.e.,
contractual complexity and recurrence) differentially
reduce risk perception (i.e., performance risk and
relational risk)? (2) How does IT integration moderate
the relationship between these contractual dimensions
and risk perception?

Contractual
complexity

Performance
risk

Contractual
recurrence

Relational
risk

IT integration

Figure1. Research model
2.2 Perceived risks

2. Conceptual development
2.1 Transaction Cost Economy
Over the last twenty years, the standard framework
for analyzing questions regarding the choice of
organizational governance form has been transaction
cost theory. TCE describes the firm as an
efficiency-inducing administrative instrument that
facilitates exchange between parties. Also, TCE
emphasizes on the deeper and more cooperative
responses that are available through conscious,
deliberate, and purposeful coordination. According to
TCE, it is costly to negotiate and write complete
contingent claims contracts that fully describe each
party’s responsibilities and rights for all future
contingencies [19]. Contract is hard to be complete.
Also, some researchers point out the continuity of
exchange is vital to its effectiveness based on TCE [27].
As such, this study builds on TCE as the theoretical
underpinning to explain how the complexity of
contract and the continuity of an exchange affect risk
perception.

Perceived risk is often defined as the probability of
unfavorable outcomes, which is hard to be estimated
[28]. There are two types of risk in perceived risk. One
refers to the partner not cooperating in good faith
(namely, relational risk), in addition to the usual risk of
unsatisfactory
business
performance
(called
performance risk). In inter-organizational collaborative
relationships, relational risk is defined as the
probability and consequences of not having
satisfactory cooperation [6]. This risk arises because of
the potential for opportunistic behavior and conflicts
on the part of both firms. Opportunistic behavior is in
shirking,
cheating,
distorting
information,
appropriating resources, and so on. Conflicts arise
because firms have their interests that are not
necessarily congruent with those of their partners [28].
Besides relational risk, many other factors may
adversely affect performance. These factors include
intensified rivalry, new entrants, demand fluctuations,
changing government policies, a lack of competence of
the partner firms, and sheer bad luck. These factors
account for performance risk, or the probability and
consequences that objectives are not achieved, despite
satisfactory cooperation among partner firms [6].
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The improvement of perceived risk can help to
maintain a relationship and achieve performance [5].
Control is widely acknowledged as essential in
inter-organizational relationships to reduce perceived
risk [5, 6]. Contract is an important part of control
governance in an inter-organizational relationship [29].
Hence, we take contracts into consideration, which
helps to understand how to decrease the perceived risk.
2.3 Contracts
Researchers
framed
contracts
into
contingency-based complexity and incentive-based
recurrence [19]. Contractual complexity is the
flexibility of contract and takes “account of many
future contingencies that would change the value of
performance—increases in the costs of inputs, the
decline in demand for the product, and so on” [20].
When change forces two parties to adapt or modify an
initial agreement, a contract which accounts of many
future contingencies offers guidelines to avoid an
inequitable state [30]. Contractual recurrence is the
continuity of contract and refers to whether parties rely
on the expectation of continued exchanges to
collaborate with their partners [19]. Partners with the
expectation of long collaboration want to have a stable,
reciprocal strategy in the further. Researchers highlight
the coordinating frame of contracting can motivate
parties to cooperate [19]. As such, this study builds on
TCE as the theoretical underpinning to explain how the
coordinating of contract affects risks.

2.4 Contracts and perceived risk
Complex contracts usually include many
contingency clauses, which provide a more
comprehensive solution and makes the adaptive
adjustments in a changeable environment. When
parties articulate many contingencies in their contracts,
they seek to accommodate the transaction to a variety
of states or future possibilities, thereby easing conflict
and disputes of performance. Under these situations,
they will promote efficiency and produce the positive
performance outcome and reduce performance risk.
When the contract includes too many specific
contingencies clauses, partners may be cannot follow
all the details of the contract. Once they do not finish
the rules or do something little inconsistent with the
contract, such behavior may be claimed as the
destruction of the rule and easily break the friendship
between them, turning a collaborator into an
antagonist.
Contract recurrence indicates that partners have
expectations of which extend beyond the duration of
the current contract and stress the long-term

contractual partnerships [16]. Partners are willing to
fulfill the performance agreement because they believe
they will be rewarded through repeat business [31]. As
Poppo, Zhou [32] demonstrated, because both of them
have the shared intent to honor the performance
agreement, the recurrent exchanges can realize higher
performance.
When exchange parties hold a long-term view of
the exchange, they are motivated to cooperate [33].
Such incentive alignment associated with greater
expectations of continued exchange can promote
collaborative relationship [32]. If parties expect to
transact with one another, they will ‘try to resolve any’
conflicts [32]. According to SET, to get more benefits
in the future, the reciprocal behavior will reduce the
uncertainty and risks. Thus, if the focal firm place
sufficient value on continued transactions, they will
keep a good relationship with the parties.

3. Hypotheses development
Moderating roles of information integration
With the development of information integration,
for performance risk with complex contracts, partners
can get enough communications, and they will know
each other deeply. If they have something confused,
they can easily find relevant information because of the
highly integrated information system. According to
transaction cost economy (TCE) perspective, effective
information flow supported by integrated IT artifacts
aligns well to contracts for coping with hazards. Also,
highly integrated information can increase their task
efficiency and decrease the Jumbled procedure to get
what you want as soon as possible. Frequent and
instant communications are facilitated by integrated IT
technology, which is conducive to reaching a
consensus of understanding contract clauses to guide
their collaboration.
However, for relational risk with complex contracts,
contract with so many contingencies have already
threatened the harmony relationship. In such a situation,
Partners may feel be monitored on the collaboration. It
may take deep this harmful relationship if the IT
integration is still very high. Hence, we propose the
following.
H1: IT integration positively moderates the effect
of contractual complexity on performance risk.
H2: IT integration positively moderates the effect
of contractual complexity on relational risk.
Contract recurrence is a symbol of continuous
collaboration, which means that both parties know
each other well. If they have perceived high contract
recurrence, they will rely more on the expectation of
continued exchanges to coordinate and safeguard
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transactions instead of information flows online. A lot
of roles have been established by usage, and they need
to follow the routine. So we propose the following.
H3: IT integration negatively moderates the effect
of contractual recurrence on performance risk.
H4: IT integration negatively moderates the effect
of contractual recurrence on relational risk.

4. Methodology
4.1. Data collection
To test above hypotheses, we collaborated with a
large water heater manufacturer in China called
Company C. China is an ideal research setting,
typifying an emerging market because of its population,

fast growing economy, increased liberalization of most
economic sectors and its role as a global manufacturing
center. China has become an indispensable part of the
global supply chain. This study collected 428 survey
questionnaires from the retailers of Company C.
Finally, 225 valid questionnaires were collected with a
response rate of approximately 53%. Following
Armstrong and Overton [34], we tested for potential
non-response bias. We compare the chi-squares of the
key measures of the responses from the first 25% of
the respondents and those of the final 25%. We did not
observe significant differences between the two groups
on these items. This result indicated that non-response
bias was not serious in this study. The demographic
information is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Demographic information
Frequency
Number of employees
Less than 10
10–50
51–100
More than 100
Firm age
Less than 4 years
4–6
7–10
More than 10
Number of IT employees
Less than 2
2–4
More than 4

Percent (%)

23
87
48
67

10.222
38.667
21.333
29.778

35
52
69
69

15.556
23.110
30.667
30.667

135
84
6

60.000
37.333
2.667

4.2. Measurement
An English questionnaire was first developed
according to previously validated measures from the
existing literature. We hired a translator who was
unfamiliar to this research to translate the questionnaire
into Chinese. The translated questionnaire was sent to
both scholars and practitioners to check for readability
and accuracy. After being revised regarding some items,
the Chinese version was translated back to English by
another professional translator. Finally, we carefully
compared the back-translated questionnaire with the
original one and determined no significant semantic
difference between both versions. Thus, the
questionnaire in Chinese is equivalent to that in

English.
All items were measured on five-point Likert scales,
which ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly
disagree.” The measurement items for the dependent
variable, namely, relational risk, were adapted from Liu
[35]. Relational risk (RSK) arising from firm-firm
interaction, whereas performance risk (PSK) from the
firm-environment interaction.
We used scales from Poppo and Zhou [19] to
measure the buyer-supplier contract, namely, contract
complexity (CC) and contract recurrence (CR). We
measured IT integration [25]. We used three items
adapted from Rai and Tang [25]. IT integration refers
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to the ability of a firm to integrate data, communication
technologies, and transaction and collaboration
applications with its IR portfolio.
We also considered firm size (SIZE), firm age
(AGE), the number of IT staff (ITD), justice and
relationship length (Length) as control variables, which
may influence the perceived risk of buyer firms. For
example, firms with large IT departments feature
sufficient human capital in reducing risks [36]. A large
number of IT staff also indicates high IT capability,
which helps the firm manage the relationship with
suppliers in the future [24]. Thus, the number of IT
staff may negatively affect perceived risk.

5 Data analysis
We initially checked the possible common method
bias caused by perceptual data, which were collected
from a single source at one point in time, common
method bias was tested as follows. Then, we adopted
Harman's one-factor test. With eigenvalues greater than
1.0 and account for 69.16% of the variance. The first
component did not account for the majority of the
variance (34.76%). All method factor loadings are
insignificant as well. The results of the tests ensure that

common method bias is unlikely to be an issue in the
study. Thus, common method bias was not a grave
concern in this study according to Harman’s one-factor
test.

5.1. Common method bias
This study employed SPSS19.0 to evaluate the
validity and reliability of the measurement model. In
Table 2, loadings of all items are above the criterion of
0.6 and scores of for AVEs of all constructs are greater
than the benchmark value of 0.50. Estimates of
Cronbach's Alpha and composite reliability are higher
than the benchmark value of 0.70. These results
indicate that a favorable convergent validity and
reliability of the measurement model of this study. We
assessed discriminate validity following the method
suggested by Paulraj, Lado [37], in which the
correlation between two constructs and the
corresponding AVE score were compared. Table 3
shows that the correlations among constructs were
lower than the corresponding square root of AVE score.
The result suggested the good discriminate validity of
this dataset.

Table 2. Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, AVE, and loading of indication variables.

Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and correlations

Note: The diagonal elements are the square roots of AVEs;* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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5.2 Hypotheses testing
Hierarchical regression analysis is conducted to test
the hypotheses. We standardize the variables to
minimize the possibility of multicollinearity [38]. As
shown in Model 1 of Table 4, justice significantly has
related to relational and performance risk. Model 2 is a
model that contained independent variables. Model 3
adds moderators. Model 4 includes all the variables.
The results showed that most of the hypotheses were
supported, except Hypothesis 4 (β = -0.139, p＞0.01).
IT capability × contractual complexity relates

negatively to performance risk (β = 0.180, p＜0.001),
in support of Hypothesis 1. IT integration × contractual
complexity relates positively to relational risk (β =
0.258, p ＜ 0.05), in support of Hypothesis 2. IT
capability × contractual recurrence relates negatively to
performance risk (β = -0.195, p＜0.01), in support of
Hypothesis 3.
To further analyze the moderating effects, we
follow the graphical procedure suggested by Aiken,
West [38] to draw Figs. 2, 3 and 4.

Table 4. Results of hierarchical regression analysis

Figure 2. Moderating effect of information integration on relationship between contract complexity and relational risk
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Figure 3. Moderating effect of information integration on relationship between contract recurrence and relational risk

Figure 4. Moderating effect of information integration on relationship between contract recurrence and performance risk

6. Discussion

7. Implications and limitations
7.1. Practical implications

We established a theoretical context to investigate
the proposition that contractual dimensions can
decrease risk perception in the Chinese context. The
findings support the basic premise of TCE that contract
governance plays a crucial role in inter-organizational
relationship. This study reveals the positive moderating
effect of IT integration on the influence of contractual
complexity on relational risk and the negative effect of
IT integration on the influence of contractual
recurrence on relational risk and performance risk.
The results of this study do not support the
hypothesis of the association between contractual
complexity and performance risk. Based on TCE, the
adaptive environment is more prone to opportunism
due to bounded rationality [21]. Thus, the performance
risk cannot be improved when the contract is
complexity.

The findings of this study also offer managerial
implications for suppliers in designing contract. When
drafting complex clauses, lawyers should avoid
stressing the basis of conflict and change. It takes time
to learn how to craft better contracts; managers may
pay attention to some important contingencies they do
not need to cover all of them. Managers should adopt
appropriate procedures to result in fewer risk
perceptions.
Our results also suggest that when drafting complex
clauses, managers should think more carefully to
integrate the information, which may be seen as a kind
of electronic surveillance. Under such situation,
contractual complexity fosters greater risk perceptions.
Further, contractual recurrence can efficiently
incentivize cooperation by setting expectations that
“you expect to be working together for a long time.”
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Our findings suggest managers must give a deep
understand of recurrent transactions. Such procedure
will weaken risk perception if managers frequently
integrate their information. From our findings,
managers can attempt to integrate with its buyers,
emphasizing that our contracts are not complex and our
purpose is to build a long-term relationship with our
partners.

7.2. Limitations and future research
Evaluating the contributions of this study in light of
certain limitations is necessary. First, we highlight the
boundary role of information integration in effect on
contract and perceived risk. However, considering
other IT factors is also very important. Future research
can consider other relevant factors that were
investigated in inter-organizational relationships, such
as absorbing ability and information sharing to enrich
the current understanding of the relationship between
contract and perceived risk. Second, all key constructs
in this study were measured by the perceptions of
individual respondents, which are subjective. Although
our analysis results prove that the common method bias
is not a serious problem, future researchers must use
objective data or collect data from multiple informants.
Third, the generalizability of our findings may be
limited by the demography of respondents because we
only measured the retailers of one manufacturer. Doing
so may enhance the internal validity of this study but
may limit its external validity. Therefore, scholars and
practitioners should exercise caution in generalizing
our findings to a company located in different
economic, political, and cultural environments.
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